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Production and price risks are among the most common concerns for agricultural producers. In 
some instances, the private sector has devised tools to manage some of such risks without any 
kind of government support. This is the case of hail insurance (which involves non-systemic 
production risks) and futures and options markets (which can be used to manage price risks). 
Quite often, however, governments have intervened by designing policies aimed at curbing the 
production or price risks faced by farmers (Gardner 1987). 
In the case of production risks, some governments provide subsidized yield insurance 
and/or emergency assistance when yields are extremely poor. In the United States, the 
Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the federal crop insurance program legislated 
under the 2014 Farm Bill will require subsidies of 89.8 billion U.S. dollars over 10 years 
(Shields 2014).1 The public sector provides some kind of support in 16 out of the 18 Latin 
American countries where agricultural insurance is available (World Bank 2010). Agricultural 
insurance subsidies in Brazil and Mexico amounted to 294 million dollars in 2009, accounting 
for 90% of the region's total public support for agricultural insurance in that year (World Bank 
2010). Rather than subsidizing insurance, governments in Caribbean countries, Bolivia, and 
Nicaragua provide post-disaster assistance (World Bank 2010). Over 1995-2005, annual 
payments for relief from natural disasters averaged about 1.2 billion dollars in the United States 
and 0.5 billion dollars in the European Union (Johnson, Hanrahan, and Schnepf 2010). 
In regard to farmers' price risks, governments have intervened in a number of ways (Dana 
and Gilbert 2009). Price supports through government purchases or deficiency payments have 
been among the most common government-instituted price-risk management tools. Both 
mechanisms have been used by the United States over the last century, and are currently 
employed in Brazil (DTB Associates 2011; USDA-ERS 2012). Other types of intervention 
aimed at mitigating price risks have included variable tariff schemes (as in Chile and Colombia 
(Knudsen and Nash 1990)), the creation of government marketing boards to act as monopsonies 
(e.g., the Australian Wheat Board and the Canadian Wheat Board), international trade 
agreements (e.g., the International Cocoa Agreements and the International Coffee Agreements), 
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as well as complex mechanisms involving long-term storage coupled with minimum prices and 
production restrictions aimed at maintaining prices within certain bands (as in the United States 
over most of the 20th century). 
Contrasting with the aforementioned schemes aimed at mitigating price risks for 
agricultural producers, Mexico has used a fairly unique government program since the mid-
1990s called "agriculture by contracts" (translated from the Spanish "agricultura por contrato"), 
typically abbreviated as "A×C." As explained in the next section, A×C involves the provision of 
subsidized market-based risk-management tools; more specifically, derivative contracts traded at 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). The magnitude of A×C has increased dramatically 
over time, with government expenditures exploding from about 11 million dollars in 2001 to 
over 700 million dollars in 2010. 
Despite the significant resources devoted by the Mexican government to this novel price-
risk mitigating mechanism, to the best of our knowledge it has not been the subject of standard 
economic welfare analysis.2 A likely reason for the lack of studies addressing its welfare impact 
is that, unlike more conventional programs, it requires the specification of a model involving not 
only production and price uncertainty, but also more than one decision time. The explicit 
modeling of uncertainty and risk preferences is critical for a proper evaluation of programs 
aimed at mitigating risks, but imposes substantial computational challenges. 
The objective of the present study is to perform an economic welfare analysis of A×C for 
the case of corn. In the process, we show how to build a simulation model able to incorporate 
key features of the program. In particular, the advocated model allows for uncertain outcomes 
and risk-averse producers. The model also exhibits more than one decision time, as participation 
in A×C requires signing forward contracts after planting but before harvest. In addition, 
“intermediaries”3 are explicitly modeled, and are assumed to possess market power to better 
reflect the reality of agricultural markets in Mexico.4 
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Mexico's "Agriculture by Contracts" Program 
In recent years, A×C has been the most important government-sponsored program aimed at 
mitigating price risks for crop producers in Mexico. Direct subsidies paid through A×C averaged 
approximately 7.55 billion Mexican pesos (about 605 million dollars) per year over 2008-2010 
(SAGARPA 2010c).5 By contrast, the second largest price-risk mitigating program (minimum 
price, officially called "ingreso objetivo" in Mexico) paid out only 4% as much as A×C over the 
same period.6 
The A×C program covers several crops, including barley, corn, cotton, oats, rice, 
sorghum, soybean, and wheat. However, A×C payments are extremely concentrated among corn, 
sorghum, and wheat, which is not surprising because they account for most of the area planted. 
For example, in 2010 corn (52%), sorghum (20%), and wheat (18%) received 90% of the A×C 
payments, and accounted for 94% of the area planted with the eight aforementioned crops (SIAP 
2015; ASERCA 2011).7 A×C covers a significant proportion of the amount produced for such 
crops (e.g., 45% for corn, 62% for sorghum, and 53% for wheat in the fall/winter cycle of 
2009/10) (ASERCA 2011). A×C subsidies are very heavily concentrated geographically, with 
the state producing most of a crop receiving an even larger share of the crop’s A×C outlays: The 
state of Sinaloa (Tamaulipas, Sonora) produced 74% (83%, 55%) of the corn (sorghum, wheat) 
in the 2009/10 fall/winter cycle, and accounted for 90% (96%, 66%) of the cycle’s A×C corn 
(sorghum, wheat) payments (SIAP 2015; ASERCA 2011). 
The A×C program is a complex mechanism involving unique features. It is based on a 
forward contract that producers and intermediaries must sign and register at designated 
government offices over a specified period of time, typically shortly after the planting season for 
the corresponding crop (SAGARPA 2010c). Each forward contract stipulates the volume of crop 
that producers will deliver to intermediaries at post-harvest, and the corresponding dollar-
denominated forward price for the transaction. The forward price consists of an officially-
determined forward basis, plus the CME closing price on the contract registration date for futures 
maturing immediately after the agreed-upon delivery date. The contract also specifies that the 
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dollar-denominated forward price is to be converted into pesos at the official exchange rate 
observed at the moment of issuing the invoice for the physical transaction of the crop. Under the 
contract, at post-harvest intermediaries (participants) are legally obligated to receive from 
participants (deliver to intermediaries) the crop volume stipulated in the contract, and pay 
(receive from) them the forward price converted to pesos. 
The A×C forward basis is determined by negotiations involving government officials and 
representatives of producers and intermediaries, where they discuss the estimated underlying 
costs (e.g., transportation, handling, and storage costs). Once an agreement is reached, the 
forward basis is officially announced, typically at the same time the government announces the 
official period over which forward contracts must be registered. There is a single forward basis 
for each major production region, i.e., the forward basis is identical for all of the A×C contracts 
corresponding to a crop produced in a particular region. 
By registering the forward contracts with the government and abiding by the A×C rules, 
producers and intermediaries gain access to two types of subsidies, namely, subsidized futures 
options and compensatory basis. The subsidies involving futures options are essentially cost-free 
at-the-money calls for producers and cost-free at-the-money puts for intermediaries. The 
compensatory basis is a payment to producers or intermediaries, depending on which party 
experiences an unfavorable change in the dollar-denominated basis. 
Upon registration of an A×C contract, the Mexican government buys at-the-money 
futures calls and puts at the CME for the crop volume stipulated in the contract. The futures 
underlying the calls and puts is the same as the one used to determine the A×C forward price. 
The options positions are canceled at the time the crop is delivered to fulfill the A×C contract. 
Gains in the call (put) position accrue to the producers (intermediaries), previous deduction of up 
to a maximum share of the initial premium to cover the government's cost to buy the call (put). 
The compensatory basis, officially named "compensación de bases," consists of a 
government payment to producers (intermediaries) if the realized "official" basis at post-harvest 
is greater (smaller) than the forward basis. Similar to the forward basis, the realized official basis 
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is settled in a negotiated manner by government officials and representatives of producers and 
intermediaries, and there is a single realized basis for each major production region. The agreed-
upon realized official basis is announced to the public at post-harvest. 
The compensatory basis is equal to the absolute value of the difference between the 
realized official basis and the forward basis; it accrues to producers if the realized basis exceeds 
the forward basis, and to intermediaries otherwise. Since the forward basis and the realized basis 
are both denominated in dollars per crop unit, the total amount paid by the government equals 
the compensatory basis times the amount of crop involved in the forward contract, valued at the 
prevailing official exchange rate. 
 
Theoretical Model 
The A×C program changes the distributions of the actual payoffs received by producers and 
intermediaries. Such distributions are endogenous and affected by risk attitudes, because market-
clearing prices and ultimately the payoffs themselves depend on the agents' responses to A×C, 
which in turn are driven by their risk preferences. Therefore, to evaluate A×C's market and 
welfare impacts, we resort to a rational expectations equilibrium displacement model that 
incorporates risk preferences and allows for both probabilistic and endogenous payoffs. 
The closest model to the one advocated here is Lence (2009a). Agents are assumed to 
hold rational expectations (i.e., agents’ subjective beliefs regarding the probability distributions 
are the same as the actual distributions). Unlike Lence, however, interannual speculative storage 
is not included, which enables us to incorporate two key A×C features into the model, namely, 
intermediaries (with market power) and a decision time between planting and post-harvest (to 
enter contracts). Allowing for speculative interannual storage would render the proposed model 
numerically intractable because of the “curse of dimensionality” (i.e., it would not be possible to 
solve the model due to the large number of dimensions involved). Importantly, however, the 
assumption of no speculative interannual storage does not seem overly restrictive for the present 
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purposes, because Mexico’s historical data suggest that speculative demand is dwarfed by the 
demand for current consumption.8 
To capture the essential elements of A×C, the model involves decision making and/or 
market-clearing conditions at three points in time, namely, “planting” (t = 0), “contracting” (t = 
1), and “post-harvest” (t = 2). Figure 1 summarizes the notation, timing of decisions, market-
clearing conditions, and occurrences of the exogenous shocks responsible for the uncertainty in 
the model. For clarity of exposition, farmers are called “participants” if they participate in A×C, 
and “non-participants” otherwise. Variables corresponding to participants, non-participants, 
consumers of final product, intermediaries, and the world market are identified by subscripts G, 
G/ , D, M, and W, respectively. In addition, ( )
i jt t
E x  is used to represent the expectations of 
random variable 
jt
x  conditional on information at time ti < tj. 
At planting, farmers choose the optimal expected crop output. Being rational, this 
decision incorporates their knowledge of the A×C program and rules as of planting time (e.g., 
producers know that the subsidized options will be at the money, and that the strike price won’t 
be known until contracting). At contracting, participants and intermediaries sign contracts 
stipulating the volume of crop to be traded at post-harvest and the corresponding dollar-
denominated forward price for the transaction, consisting of the time-1 futures price for post-
harvest maturity at the CME (F1), plus the forward basis (B1). The dollar-denominated forward 
price is to be converted into pesos at the official exchange rate prevailing at post-harvest (X2). 
At post-harvest all of the uncertainties are resolved. Contractual obligations are fulfilled, 
and non-participants sell their output to intermediaries in the spot market. Intermediaries also 
import crop from the world market (which is characterized by an infinitely elastic supply at the 
prevailing world price), process the crop, and sell the processed product to final consumers in the 
spot market. Consumer demand for final product at post-harvest satisfies standard regularity 
conditions (e.g., it is a differentiable and negatively-sloped function of price). Domestic spot 
prices (and the basis) are determined by market clearing, so that in equilibrium the consumption 
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of final product in crop-equivalent units (QD,2) equals the aggregate crop output of participants 
(QG,2) and non-participants ( ,2GQ / ), plus crop imports (QW,2): QD,2 = QG,2 + ,2GQ /  + QW,2. 
The fundamental difference between A×C participation and non-participation is the net 
price received by and paid to producers. The price received by non-participants ( ,2GP/ ) is the 
same as the net price intermediaries pay to them ( ,2MGP / ). In contrast, for participants the net price 
received ( ,2GP ) is greater than the net price paid by intermediaries ( ,2MGP ). More specifically, 
 
(1) PG,2 = (F1 + B1) X2 + ProdCompBas2 + CallSubsidy2, 
 
(2) PMG,2 = (F1 + B1) X2 – IntCompBas2 – PutSubsidy2. 
 
That is, both the net price received by and paid to participants include the forward price (F1 + B1) 
converted into pesos at the prevailing exchange rate (X2). In addition, A×C participants receive 
the compensatory basis (ProdCompBas2 ≥ 0) and the call subsidy (CallSubsidy2 ≥ 0), whereas 
intermediaries get the intermediary compensatory basis (IntCompBas2 ≥ 0) and the put subsidy 
(PutSubsidy2 ≥ 0). The compensatory basis and the option subsidies create a gap between the net 
prices received by and paid to participants.9 
The producer compensatory basis is an additional payment that participants receive when 
the post-harvest basis is higher than the forward basis. It is defined as  
 
(3) ProdCompBas2 ≡ max(B2 – B1, 0) X2, 
 
where B2 ≡ ( ,2MGP / /X2 – F2) is the realized post-harvest basis (expressed in dollars per crop unit). 
Similarly, the intermediary compensatory basis IntCompBas2 ≡ max(B1 – B2, 0) X2 is a subsidy 
paid to intermediaries when the realized post-harvest basis is smaller than the forward basis. 
The call and put subsidies are given by 
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(4) CallSubsidy2 ≡ max[(1 – ωG) max(F2 – F1, 0), max(F2 – F1 – ωG Call1, 0)] X2, 
 
(5) PutSubsidy2 ≡ max[(1 – ωM) max(F1 – F2, 0), max(F1 – F2 – ωM Put1, 0)] X2, 
 
where ωG ∈ [0, 1] and ωG ∈ [0, 1] are A×C cost-recovery parameters, and Call1 and Put1 are 
respectively the time-1 premiums for the corresponding at-the-money CME futures calls and 
puts. The call (put) subsidy benefits participants (intermediaries) if futures rise (fall) between 
contracting and post-harvest. 
The next two subsections discuss domestic farmers and intermediaries in greater detail, as 
A×C directly affects them. The last subsection addresses the welfare impact of A×C. 
 
Domestic Crop Production 
Let g index the type of farmers (i.e., g = G and g = G/  refer to participants and non-participants, 
respectively). Following Lence (2009a), aggregate crop output by farmers of type g is given by 
Qg,2 = ng qg,2, where ng is the number of type-g producers and qg,2 is the corresponding average 
output per farmer. The amount produced equals qg,2 = qg,0 εg,1 εg,2, where qg,0 ≡ E0(qg,2) is the 
expected output as of planting, and εg,1 and εg,2 represent the exogenous output shocks occurring 
between planting and post-harvest. Output shocks must be positive (εg,1, εg,2 ≥ 0) because output 
cannot be negative. 
At planting, type-g farmers choose the level of expected output * ,0gq  that maximizes the 
expected utility of their post-harvest profits πg,2(q) ≡ Pg,2 q εg,1 εg,2 – Cg(q): 
 
(6) * ,0gq  ≡ argmaxq{E0[Ug(Pg,2 q εg,1 εg,2 – Cg(q))]}. 
 
In this expression, Ug(∙) and Cg(∙) denote, respectively, the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function and the cost function of type-g farmers, and Pg,2 represents the net price received by 
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type-g producers at post-harvest. Cost function Cg(∙) satisfies standard regularity conditions (e.g., 
Cg(∙) is continuous, increasing, and convex). 
 
Intermediaries 
Letting qmG,2, ,2mGq / , and qmW,2 be respectively the m
th intermediary’s crop acquisitions from 
participants, non-participants, and the world market, the amount of crop processed and sold by 
such firm in crop-equivalent units is qmD,2 = qmG,2 + ,2mGq /  + qmW,2. Intermediary m's post-harvest 
profits can be represented as: 
 
(7) πm,2 = PD,2 qmD,2 – CmD(qmD,2) – PMG,2 qmG,2 – ,2MGP / ,2mGq /  – F2 X2 qmW,2 – CmW(qmW,2), 
 
where PD,2 is the price of the final product, and functions CmD(∙) and CmW(∙) respectively 
represent the costs of processing the crop and the costs of the logistics involved in importing and 
having the crop ready for processing. Cost functions CmD(∙) and CmW(∙) satisfy standard regularity 
conditions. 
Intermediaries take world prices and exchange rates as given, but they are aware that 
their decisions influence the prices they receive for the final product (PD,2) and the net prices 
they pay to producers (PMg,2). Intermediaries' power in the procurement market effectively means 
that they take into account their impact on the forward basis (B1) and the realized post-harvest 
basis (B2), because ,2MGP /  = (F2 + B2) X2 and PMG,2 = [F1 + min(B1, B2)] X2 – PutSubsidy2 (which 
is obtained by plugging IntCompBas2 ≡ max(B1 – B2, 0) X2 into expression (2)). 
At post-harvest (t = 2), intermediary m's only decisions are the purchases from non-
participants ,2( )mGq /  and from the world market (qmW,2).
10 At an interior solution, the first-order 
conditions (FOCs) for the maximization of profits (7) (i.e., ∂πm,2/∂qmW,2 = 0 and ∂πm,2 ,2/ mGq /∂  = 
0) can be expressed as:11 
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(8) PD,2 = 
1
(1 )mDm−
 [ ,2
,2
( )mD mD
mD
C q
q
∂
∂
 + F2 X2 + ,2
,2
( )mW mW
mW
C q
q
∂
∂
], 
 
(9) B2 = 
2 1 ,2 ,2
1
[1 (1 / ) ]B B mG mG mGq qι m< / /+ +
 {
2
1
X
 [(1 − mmD) PD,2 − ,2
,2
( )mD mD
mD
C q
q
∂
∂
] − F2}. 
 
In the equations above, mmD ∈ [0, 1) represents intermediary m’s power in the final product 
market,12 mGm /  ≥ 0 denotes firm m’s power in the market for non-participants’ crop, and 2 1B Bι <  is 
the indicator function (equal to 1 if B2 < B1, and 0 otherwise). According to (8), the greater firm 
m's power in the market for final product, the larger its final product markup over marginal cost. 
Similarly, (9) implies that the larger mGm /  in equilibrium, the greater firm m’s non-participant 
crop markdown relative to m's net marginal revenue. 
The term 
2 1 ,2 ,2
/B B mG mG mGq qι m< / /  in expression (9) implies that the forward basis (B1), 
contracted with participants at t = 1, may have a negative impact on the acquisitions from non-
participants at t = 2. Such term originates from the intermediary compensatory basis scheme 
(IntCompBas2), which effectively allows intermediaries to pay participants the smaller of the 
forward or the realized basis (i.e., min(B1, B2)). Intuitively, when intermediaries with market 
power increase purchases from non-participants, they end up paying a higher basis (B2). The 
higher basis applies only to the amount bought from non-participants if B2 ≥ B1, but it applies to 
purchases from both participants and non-participants if B2 < B1. As a result, if intermediaries 
have power in the procurement market ( mGm /  > 0), the compensatory basis scheme tends to 
depress the actual post-harvest (B2) basis relative to the forward basis (B1). 
Conceptually, the post-harvest Cournot-Nash market equilibrium can be computed by 
simultaneously solving equations (8) and (9) for all intermediaries, under the restrictions that 
aggregate purchases from participants and non-participants equal the respective aggregate 
supplies. 
At contracting time (t = 1), the decision problem faced by the mth intermediary is to 
choose the amount of crop to contract with participants qmG,1 ≡ E1(qmG,2), which commits firm m 
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to buy at post-harvest the actual participants’ output qmG,2 = qmG,1 εG,2. Assuming that 
intermediaries maximize expected post-harvest profits (7),13 the corresponding FOC 
(∂E1(πm,2)/∂qmG,1) at an interior solution can be written analogously to FOC (9) as follows: 
 
(10) B1 = 
2 11 2 ,2
1 2 ,2
1
( )
[1 ]
( )
B B G
mG
G
E X
E X
ι ε
m
ε
>+
 {
1 2 ,2
1
( )GE X ε
E1[(1 − mmD) PD,2 εG,2 − ,2
,2
( )mD mD
mD
C q
q
∂
∂
εG,2 
 
+ max(B1 − B2, 0) X2 εG,2 + PutSubsidy2 εG,2] – F1}. 
 
In the above expression, mmG ≥ 0 denotes firm m’s power in the market for participants' crop. At 
the optimum, the greater the value of mmG, the larger the forward basis markdown relative to m’s 
expected net marginal revenue. In the perfectly competitive case where mmG = 0, the markdown 
is zero and the forward basis equals firm m’s expected net marginal revenue. 
Comparison of (9) and (10) reveals two key differences between the forward basis (B1) 
and the realized basis (B2) -- in addition, of course, to the fact that the former is established at 
contracting (t = 1), whereas the latter is set at post-harvest (t = 2).14 First, relative to the realized 
basis, the forward basis is augmented by the expected values of the payments related to the basis 
compensation scheme (E1[max(B1 − B2, 0) X2 εG,2]) and the put subsidy (E1(PutSubsidy2 εG,2)). 
Second, intermediaries' procurement market power (mmg) has greater impact on the realized basis 
than on the forward basis. 
The preceding discussion also shows that, to the extent that intermediaries have market 
power in the domestic crop market, the intermediary compensatory basis (IntCompBas2) 
provides an incentive for them to strategically discriminate against non-participants in favor of 
participants. In the absence of such discrimination, the first term on the right-hand side of (9) 
would be 1/(1 + mGm / ), and its counterpart in (10) would equal 1/(1 + mmG). 
Best contracting responses for each intermediary can be obtained in the same manner as 
previously described in connection with expressions (8) and (9), providing as many equations as 
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unknowns. In principle, the Cournot-Nash market equilibrium at contracting (t = 1) can be 
derived from such set of equations, plus the restriction that the total amount contracted with 
participants must equal their expected aggregate output QG,1 = E1(QG,2). 
 
Measures of A×C's Welfare Effects 
The welfare effects of A×C on participants, non-participants, intermediaries, and final consumers 
are measured by the respective post-harvest compensating incomes ,2iY  for i ∈ {G, ,G/  D, M}. 
To calculate compensating income ,2iY , compare (a) the scenario without A×C, with (b) an 
alternative scenario incorporating A×C, but subtracting the fixed amount Yi,2 from the post-
harvest income of agents in group i. Define scalars iU  and ,2( )i iU Y  as group i agents' expected 
utility in market equilibrium under scenarios (a) and (b), respectively.15 Then, the post-harvest 
compensating income ,2iY  is the certain income implied by the equality iU  = ,2( ).i iU Y  In other 
words, subtracting the amount ,2iY  from post-harvest income under A×C leaves agents in group i 
indifferent between having the program and not having it.16 
Taxpayers' direct subsidy outlays for A×C are: 
 
(11) T2 = QG,2 max(B2 – B1, B1 – B2) X2 
+ QG,2 {exp[r (t2 − t1)] Call1 – ωG min[max(F2 – F1, 0), Call1]} X2 
+ QG,2 {exp(r (t2 − t1)) Put1 – ωM min[max(F1 – F2, 0), Put1]} X2, 
 
where r is the risk-free interest rate. The first term corresponds to the compensatory basis 
payments, whereas the terms comprising Call1 and Put1 arise from the option subsidies to 
participants (calls) and intermediaries (puts). Assuming taxpayers are risk-neutral, the 
compensating income associated with the direct subsidies (T2) equals the negative of the mean 
outlays. 
Importantly, A×C's total cost comprises not only the direct subsidy outlays (T2), but also 
the administrative cost of operating the program, and the marginal deadweight loss of raising the 
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tax revenues needed to implement A×C. The latter, also called the marginal cost of public funds, 
is the burden on the rest of the economy arising from the distortions, due to the taxes imposed to 
raise the funds to support the intervention (Auerbach and Hines 2002). 
 
Numerical Implementation for Mexico's Corn Market 
The model is applied to quantify the market and welfare effects of the A×C program for corn, 
which is Mexico's main crop. This requires the specification of the various functions involved, 
including the probability density functions (pdfs) of the exogenous random shocks, and of 
appropriate values for the underlying parameters. To this end, it is also important to consider 
numerical issues, such as the choice of methods to compute optimal values and expectations, as 
well as practical considerations, like parameterization and workability.17 These topics are the 
focus of the next subsections. 
 
Specification of Functional Forms 
Consistent with an equilibrium displacement framework, cost functions are postulated to be 
isoelastic, so that Ci(x) = κi ixη  for i ∈ {G, ,G/  mD, mW}.18 The term κi > 0 is a scaling 
parameter, and ηi is the cost elasticity. The marginal cost elasticity is given by (ηi − 1); hence, ηi 
> 1 is required for increasing marginal costs, and ηi ≥ 2 is necessary for marginal cost to rise at 
an increasing rate. Under certainty and perfect competition, the supply elasticity equals the 
inverse of the marginal cost elasticity, which facilitates the interpretation and parameterization of 
ηi. 
An isoelastic function is also used to represent aggregate demand from final consumers, 
QD,2 = κD ,2DDP
η−  εD,1 εD,2, where κD > 0 is a scaling parameter and ηD > 0 is the own-price demand 
elasticity. Terms εD,1 > 0 and εD,2 > 0 are exogenous random shocks to demand (e.g., unexpected 
changes in consumers’ income). Without loss of generality, the demand shock expectations 
satisfy the conditions E0(εD,1) = E0(εD,2) = E1(εD,2) = 1. 
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As in Lence (2009a), farmers' utility functions are specialized to the constant absolute 
risk aversion (CARA) form, i.e., Ug(π) = [1 − exp(− λg π)]/λg for g ∈ {G, }G/ , where parameter 
λg is type-g farmers' coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Risk neutrality is a limiting case of this 
CARA utility, since limλ→0{[1 − exp(− λ π)]/λ} = π. Results are robust to changes in the 
specification of the utility function, as long as the levels of relative risk aversion (defined as −π 
U″(π)/U′(π)) are kept similar and the risks involved are neither too large nor too asymmetric 
(Černý 2004; Lence 2009b). 
Futures prices and exchange rates evolve according to Ft = Ft−1 εF,t and Xt = Xt−1 εX,t for t 
∈ {1, 2}, with F0, X0, and random shocks εF,t > 0 and εX,t > 0 exogenously given.19 The 
exogenous shocks εF,t > 0 and εX,t > 0 represent unexpected events taking place between times t 
and (t – 1), and are identically and independently log-normally distributed. That is, letting N(u, 
v2) denote the normal distribution with mean u and variance v2, ln(εi,τ) i.i.d. N(−0.5 2iσ  (tτ − tτ−1), 
2
iσ  (tτ − tτ−1)) for i ∈ {F, X} and τ ∈ {1, 2}. Parameter σi is the volatility per unit of time (i.e., σi 
is the annual volatility if time is measured in years). Since E(ε) = exp(u + 0.5 v2) if ln(ε)~ N(u, 
v2), the assumed pdfs satisfy the conditions E0(εi,1) = E0(εi,2) = E1(εi,2) = 1 for i = {F, X}. In other 
words, futures prices and exchange rates are unbiased. 
Similarly, the exogenous random demand shocks, εD,t (t ∈ {1, 2}), are identically and 
independently log-normally distributed. In contrast, following the seminal work by Nelson and 
Preckel (1989), the exogenous output shocks εg,t (g ∈ {G, }G/  and t ∈ {1, 2}) are assumed to be 
conditionally beta distributed. Note that the beta distribution implies that the pdf of output 
shocks at t = 2 depends on the realized output shock at t = 1 (intuitively, since beta-distributed 
shocks have a finite support, if εg,1 is high, the distribution of the corresponding εg,2 must display 
higher probabilities of small shocks than if εg,1 is small; see, e.g., Hennessy (2011)). 
Finally, consistent with the log-normally distributed futures, the at-the-money futures 
calls (Call1) and puts (Put1) involved in the option subsidies (see expressions (4), (5), and (11)) 
are assumed to be traded at "fair" values, i.e., Black’s arbitrage-free premiums (Black 1976). 
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Parameterization and Calibration 
The values used for non-calibrated parameters are reported in table 1. Such values represent 
estimates based on (a) historical data (e.g., length of planting/contracting and contracting/post-
harvest periods, and parameters of shocks’ pdfs), or (b) reasonable assumptions about the 
underlying objects (e.g., cost elasticities and own-price elasticity of demand for final product). 
All intermediaries are assumed to have the same cost functions, so that κmD = κMD and 
ηmD = ηMD for all m. The equilibrium amounts bought, processed, and sold by individual 
intermediaries are the symmetric pure-strategy Nash-Cournot equilibrium responses, and the 
solution is unique under the stated assumptions. Since by construction the equilibrium level of 
market power must be identical for all intermediaries, market power is taken to be a parameter to 
make the numerical solution tractable, with mmD = mMD, mGm /  = MGm / , and mmG = mMG for all m. 
As formulated in Section 2, the model implies that the vast majority of the years would 
be characterized by compensatory basis payments to intermediaries rather than participants (i.e., 
B1 > B2). However, this implication is contradicted by the historical record, as that there have 
been more years featuring B1 < B2 than B1 > B2.20 Therefore, to reconcile the model results with 
the historical evidence, the constraint B1 ≤ E1(B2) was added. This restriction ensures that, on 
average, the compensatory basis received by participants is at least as large as the compensatory 
basis received by intermediaries. 
For the simulations assuming risk-averse producers, the coefficient of absolute risk 
aversion is standardized by setting it equal to ˆgλ  = 3.1/ 0 ,2( )
A C
gE π
× , where ,2
A C
gπ
×  denotes the 
equilibrium post-harvest profits for g-type producers in the A×C scenario.21 This approach 
follows Lence (2009a) and ensures that the expected coefficient of relative risk aversion is 
exactly 3.1 under A×C (which is the scenario used for the calibration), and very close to 3.1 in 
the scenario without A×C. This value is used by Zant (2001, p. 700), and is well within the range 
considered typical (Gollier 2001, pp. 31 and 289; Kocherlakota 1996). 
The number of farmers (ng) can be chosen arbitrarily because, as explained in the next 
paragraph, production cost scaling parameters κg (g ∈ {G, })G/  are set by calibration.22 Hence, to 
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facilitate computations, the number of farmers is set equal to the mean aggregate output used for 
calibration (i.e., ˆgn  = ,2gQ , as shown in tables 1 and 2).
23 
To ensure that the model yields endogenous quantities consistent with the historical 
record, values for the scaling parameters of the demand and cost functions κi (i ∈ {D, G, ,G/  
MD, MW}) are obtained by calibration. The five scaling parameters are calibrated to make the 
model's five endogenous variables listed in table 2 equal to their respective historical averages.24 
Thus, running the model under the A×C parameterization shown in table 1 yields the expected 
output, expected imports, and expected prices reported in table 2. 
 
Numerical Methods to Compute the Solution 
To compute the rational expectations of the model’s endogenous variables (e.g., output and 
prices) at planting-time, one must first solve for the market equilibrium conditions under each 
possible state of the world at contracting and post-harvest times. This task is non-trivial, because 
the model has no closed-form solution and is highly nonlinear. 
To compute expectations, the exogenous random shocks' pdfs are approximated by 
Gaussian quadrature (Judd 1998), so that each state of the world is represented by a quadrature 
node. Letting #i,t denote the number of nodes corresponding to exogenous random variable εi,t (i 
∈ {G, ,G/  F, X, D} and t ∈ {1, 2}), solving the model requires calculating #t ≡ #G,t × G,t# /  × #F,t × 
#X,t × #D,t equilibrium values for each of the endogenous variables at t ∈ {1, 2}. Since the 
computational burden increases exponentially with the number of nodes, to obtain an acceptable 
level of accuracy while maintaining tractability, #i,t = 3 nodes were used for i ∈ {G, ,G/  F, X, D} 
and t ∈ {1, 2}. 
The model was solved numerically by function iteration (Miranda and Fackler 2002, Ch. 
3), employing the programming language MATLAB version R2014a 64-bit. The iteration steps 
are outlined in the Online Appendix C, and the Gaussian quadrature was implemented with the 
computer routines developed by Miranda and Fackler (2013). 
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Results and Discussion 
In the interest of space, we focus on the impact of introducing A×C into a scenario without 
government intervention, for selected parameterizations. Further, it is assumed that neither 
participants nor intermediaries would buy CME futures options if it weren’t for the A×C 
subsidies.25 
The market effects caused by the introduction of A×C are summarized in table 3. To 
illustrate the contents of this table, consider the cell at the intersection of the "Net Prices 
Received by Participants" row with the "Risk-Averse Producers" column. This cell shows that, 
compared to the no-program scenario, A×C increases the mean of the net corn price received by 
participants by 4.8%, and reduces its standard deviation by 14.5%. Analogously, the 10%, 50%, 
and 90% quantiles of the pdfs of the net corn price received by participants are respectively 
11.1% higher, 2.4% higher, and 1.4% smaller under A×C. 
The most noticeable price effects of A×C are the increase in the mean net price received 
by participants (4.8% to 5.3%), the even larger fall in the mean net price paid to participants 
(5.6% to 6.0%), and the substantial reductions in their standard deviations (14.5% to 18.5% for 
prices received, and 28.8% to 32.2% for prices paid). The mean and standard deviation of the net 
prices received by and paid to non-participants also decrease, but by smaller amounts. Since 
A×C reduces the mean and the standard deviations of the prices paid to both participants and 
non-participants, intermediaries benefit regardless of the type of farmers from whom they buy. 
The quantile changes reveal that the higher (lower) mean and the lower standard 
deviation in the net price received by (paid to) participants stems mostly from the smaller 
probability of occurrence of low (high) prices. Figure 2 provides a visual representation of this 
effect, showing that A×C makes the pdfs of the net prices received by (paid to) participants much 
less skewed to the left (right). 
A×C causes output to rise for participants, and fall for non-participants (see table 3). 
Under risk-neutrality, the resulting own-price supply elasticity is approximately 0.67 (= 3.6/5.3 
for participants and = −0.3/(−0.5) for non-participants), which is the value one would obtain 
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under certainty given the assumed production cost elasticity (see Subsection 3.1). In contrast, 
output changes under risk aversion imply supply elasticities larger than 0.67 for participants and 
smaller than 0.67 for non-participants. Such difference in price elasticities is caused by the lower 
price volatility associated with A×C, which tends to increase production for both participants and 
non-participants under risk aversion. This volatility effect reinforces (partly offsets) the output 
response of participants (non-participants) to the program's higher (lower) prices. 
The impact of A×C on domestic consumption is positive, but negligible. Regardless of 
risk preferences, imports fall due to the rise in aggregate domestic output. However, the 
contraction in imports is larger when farmers are risk averse, because of the aforementioned 
positive production response to lower price volatility. 
A×C has a substantial impact on profits. Mean profits for participants and intermediaries 
experience a sizeable boost (of 8.5% to 9.2% and 4.0% to 5.3%, respectively), whereas mean 
profits for non-participants decline (by 0.7% to 1.5%). 
 
Welfare Effects 
To interpret the welfare results, it is important to note that government intervention in the present 
model may enhance total net surplus for two reasons. First, the scenario without A×C assumes 
that intermediaries have market power, i.e., it is not a first-best market outcome. Thus, A×C may 
increase total net surplus if it moves equilibrium outcomes closer to the intervention-free 
competitive equilibrium (e.g., Romano 1988). Second, when producers are risk-averse, 
interventions that transfer farmers' risks to risk-neutral intermediaries and/or taxpayers, like A×C 
does, may enhance aggregate welfare if the gains associated with the transfers outweigh the 
standard allocative inefficiency losses (i.e., the standard deadweight loss triangles). 
A×C's welfare effects are summarized in table 4. Results are reported for two levels of 
intermediaries’ market power to investigate its impact (recall that table 3 is computed using mMD 
= 0.1 and MGm  = MGm /  = 0.2). The "Society" row contains the deadweight losses arising from the 
taxes levied to raise the revenues needed to pay for the direct subsidies and their administration 
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costs. Such losses are listed separately, because no information is available to allocate them 
among the other sectors.  
Considering the lower level of market power first, table 4 shows that A×C leads to total 
surplus losses ranging from 56 million dollars under risk aversion to 70 million dollars under risk 
neutrality. The main beneficiaries are participants (who gain between 92 and 95 million dollars) 
and intermediaries (who gain between 84 and 110 million dollars). The biggest losses are 
experienced by taxpayers, who pay 202 million dollars in direct subsidies (184 million dollars) 
and program administration (18 million dollars). Non-participants lose between 3 million dollars 
under risk neutrality and 12 million dollars under risk aversion. In addition, raising taxes to fund 
A×C costs society 50 million dollars in deadweight losses. 
Regardless of risk preferences, doubling intermediaries' procurement market power 
increases A×C's losses to non-participants, reduces the benefits to participants, and raises 
taxpayers' costs and society's deadweight losses from tax collection. Contrastingly, higher market 
power significantly boosts intermediaries' gains. In fact, doubling market power in the presence 
of risk-averse producers raises intermediaries' gains by 26 (= 136 − 110) million dollars, which 
exceeds the benefit reductions and/or loss increases accruing to all of the other sectors combined 
(22 million dollars). As a result, somewhat counterintuitively, the scenario with higher 
intermediaries' market power has a smaller total net surplus loss (52 million dollars vs. 56 
million dollars). 
Participants' welfare gains are slightly smaller under risk aversion than under risk 
neutrality. This result is explained by the fact that under risk aversion A×C increases 
participants’ mean profits by less than under risk neutrality, and it slightly increases the standard 
deviation of participants’ profits (see table 3). Non-participants also experience greater welfare 
losses under risk aversion compared to risk neutrality. Given the profit figures reported in table 
3, this outcome implies that for non-participants, the loss in mean profits caused by A×C 
outweighs the benefits associated with the smaller standard deviation of profits. 
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Overall, risk aversion has a positive and sizeable effect on total net surplus, but not large 
enough to revert the program's negative impact on total welfare. If the main purpose of the 
government intervention is to reduce producers' risks, A×C seems an expensive and inefficient 
way to achieve that goal.26 
Despite the substantial transfers across sectors associated with A×C, the standard 
deadweight loss triangles (i.e., the deadweight losses assuming risk neutrality, and ignoring 
administrative costs and the costs of raising public funds) are small. The large import cost 
elasticity adopted for the simulations implies that, leaving aside administrative costs and the 
costs of raising public funds, the main deadweight losses are due to overproduction by 
participants and underproduction by non-participants. Evaluated at the means, participants' 
standard deadweight loss triangle amounts to less than 2 million dollars, and non-participants' 
loss triangle is even smaller.27 Clearly, the standard deadweight loss triangles are dwarfed by the 
administrative cost and the allocative inefficiencies on the general economy induced by the taxes 
levied to fund A×C. 
 
Welfare Effects when A×C Reduces Intermediaries' Market Power 
The preceding analysis assumes that intermediaries' market power, when procuring crops from 
domestic producers, is the same in the scenario with A×C ( A CMgm
× ) as in the scenario without A×C 
( A CMgm
× ) , i.e., A CMgm
×  = A CMgm
× . However, A×C may reduce intermediaries' procurement market 
power, in which case A CMgm
×  < A CMgm
× .28 For example, the negotiations to determine the A×C 
forward basis include government officials and representatives of participants, which may 
weaken intermediaries' ability to pay low prices. 
If A×C does diminish intermediaries' market power, table 4 need not accurately reflect its 
impact on welfare. To provide insights on this issue, simulations were performed assuming that 
intermediaries' market power falls from ˆ A CMgm
× ( )A CMgm
×  without A×C to A CMgm
×  < ˆ A CMgm
× ( )A CMgm
×  under 
A×C. For a given value of A CMgm
× , the no-A×C market power ˆ A CMgm
× ( )A CMgm
×  is obtained by 
calibration, so as to leave intermediaries indifferent about joining A×C. The rationale for 
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defining ˆ A CMgm
× ( )A CMgm
×  in this manner is that intermediaries would (not) voluntarily take part in 
A×C if doing so changed their market power from A CMgm
×  < (>) ˆ A CMgm
× ( )A CMgm
×  to A CMgm
× , as the gains 
from subsidies would outweigh (be outweighed by) the losses from the reduced market power. 
Assuming voluntary participation by intermediaries, the maximum reduction in market 
power that A×C can achieve equals ( ˆ A CMgm
× ( )A CMgm
×  − A CMgm
× ). More importantly, when market 
power under A×C equals A CMgm
× , producers' gains relative to the ˆ A CMgm
× ( )A CMgm
×  scenario constitute 
an upper bound for the producers' benefits from A×C. Therefore, if A×C's objective is to enhance 
producers' well-being, comparing the ˆ A CMgm
× ( )A CMgm
×  and A CMgm
×  scenarios is useful because it 
provides upper bounds on the targeted population's benefits. 
Table 5 reports welfare results when A×C induces the maximum feasible cut in the 
market power of intermediaries. To facilitate comparisons, results corresponding to no change in 
market power are shown within brackets. Panel A (B) shows that if market power is A CMgm
×  = 0.1 
(0.2) under A×C, the upper bound on intermediaries' market power without A×C equals 
ˆ A CMgm
× (0.1)  = 0.184 ( ˆ A CMgm
× (0.2)  = 0.321) under risk-neutrality, and ˆ A CMgm
× (0.1)  = 0.207 (
ˆ A CMgm
× (0.2)  = 0.346) under risk aversion. By construction, intermediaries' surplus is unchanged if 
A×C reduces their market power by the maximum feasible amount. Contrastingly, if market 
power remains the same after introducing A×C, intermediaries gain substantial amounts. For 
example, if producers are risk-averse and market power stays unchanged at A CMgm
×  = ˆ A CMgm
× (0.2)  = 
0.346, introducing A×C benefits intermediaries by 153 million dollars. 
When A×C cuts market power as much as feasible, the main beneficiaries are 
participants, followed by non-participants; consumers benefit the least. The gains to participants, 
non-participants, and consumers, the taxpayers' losses, and the costs of public funds are all larger 
under A CMgm
×  = 0.2 than under A CMgm
×  = 0.1. Overall, however, the changes in surpluses for 
individual sectors are remarkably similar across the two panels. 
The surplus changes computed by assuming market power is reduced, minus the surplus 
changes calculated under the assumption that A×C leaves market power the same, can be termed 
the marginal gains from reducing market power. Such gains are quite large for producers, and 
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greater for non-participants than for participants.29 Marginal gains are smaller but still sizeable 
for consumers. 
Significantly, even under the extreme assumption that A×C reduces market power as 
much as possible, the program causes sizeable total losses. Moreover, if producers are risk 
averse, the total loss is larger for the scenario with the maximum market power reduction (57 to 
62 million dollars) than for the scenario where market power is unchanged (50 million dollars). 
In short, the efficiency gains from reducing intermediaries' market power are small relative to the 
cost of A×C. As a result, A×C has a substantial negative impact on total surplus, regardless of 
whether it reduces intermediaries' market power or not. 
 
Conclusions 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to perform market and welfare effects of 
Mexico's A×C program. A×C not only has involved substantial government expenditures in 
recent years, but also exhibits unique features, like the provision of basis subsidies and 
subsidized CME futures options to both producers and intermediaries. To capture A×C's key 
characteristics, the proposed model incorporates uncertainty, and includes intermediaries 
possessing market power. The model also allows participants and intermediaries to sign A×C 
forward contracts after planting, but before harvest. 
Our analysis focuses on Mexico's corn market. A×C shifts the pdf of the net price 
received by participants to the right and makes it more right-skewed, whereas it has the opposite 
effect on the pdf of the net prices paid by intermediaries to participants. Overall, the mean net 
price received by (paid to) participants increases by about 5% (decreases by almost 6%), and the 
mean net prices received by non-participants decline by approximately 1%. A×C also reduces the 
standard deviation of the prices received by producers and paid by intermediaries. The impact on 
profits is substantial: mean profits jump by around 9% for participants, and 4% to 5% for 
intermediaries, but shrink by about 1% for non-participants. 
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Assuming that A×C does not change intermediaries' market power, it is estimated to yield 
annual losses in aggregate welfare of about 50 (70) million dollars if producers are risk-averse 
(risk-neutral). If anything, such figures are likely to underestimate the actual losses, because very 
conservative assumptions are used to compute administration costs and the marginal cost of 
public funds. In addition, it is assumed that the government purchases the CME futures options 
for the A×C program at "fair" values and without incurring transaction costs. 
Intermediaries and participants benefit the most from A×C. Taxpayers are the biggest 
losers, spending almost 200 million dollars in direct subsidies alone, plus the sizable 
administration costs. Non-participants also suffer large surplus losses. In addition, society as a 
whole experiences substantial inefficiency losses due to the need to collect taxes to fund A×C.  
Importantly, even if A×C reduced intermediaries' market power to the largest extent 
feasible, it would still cause substantial losses in aggregate welfare. In such circumstances, 
however, introducing A×C would benefit all producers (both participants as well as non-
participants) the most, while leaving intermediaries' surplus unchanged. 
Some other aspects of A×C also deserve attention. For example, A×C contracts fix 
dollar-denominated forward prices, which leaves producers and intermediaries exposed to 
foreign exchange risk. More importantly, unless one is willing to assume that A×C is able to 
significantly curtail intermediaries' market power, the program is quite regressive, as most of its 
benefits are captured by intermediaries (which are typically large firms). 
In summary, despite A×C's novel features, the present analysis suggests that it causes 
substantial losses in aggregate economic surplus for the case of corn. Neither the mitigation of 
price risks nor the reduction in intermediaries' market power seem capable of yielding producer 
surplus gains large enough to compensate for A×C's significant cost. Hence, it would seem 
necessary to invoke other types of benefits to justify the program from an economic standpoint. 
Such benefits might include, among others, fostering the development of local derivative markets 
by familiarizing farmers with hedging instruments commonly used in developed countries, 
enhancing farmers’ terms of financing through intermediaries, and making farmers more willing 
 
24 
to switch to higher revenue crops if they are under A×C. Measuring the extent of such benefits 
would be an important area of inquiry for future research regarding the A×C program. 
 
  
 
25 
References 
Appendini, K. 2014. "Reconstructing the Maize Market in Rural Mexico." Journal of Agrarian 
Change 14(1):1-25. 
Apoyos y Servicios a la Comercialización Agropecuaria, Coordinación General de 
Comercialización (ASERCA). 2010a. "Apertura de Ventanillas - Agricultura por Contrato 
Ciclo Agrícola Otoño-Invierno/2009-10." México: Coordinación General de 
Comercialización, ASERCA. Available at http://www.cmp.org/noticias/DGDM-
20100115_01.pdf 
–––. 2010b. "Aviso: Compensación de Bases - Agricultura por Contrato Ciclo Agrícola Otoño-
Invierno / 2009-10." México: Coordinación General de Comercialización, ASERCA. 
Available at http://www.infoaserca.gob.mx/programas/DGDM-20100802_01.pdf 
–––. 2011. "Programa de Atención a Problemas Estructurales: Apoyo al Ingreso Objetivo y a la 
Comercialización - Informe de Resultados al Cuarto Trimestre, Ejercicio Fiscal 2010." 
México: ASERCA. Available at http://www.aserca.gob.mx/artman/publish/article_1699.asp 
Auerbach, A. J., and J. R. Hines. 2002. "Taxation and Economic Efficiency." In Auerbach, A. J., 
and M. Feldstein, eds., Handbook of Public Economics, Volume 3, Chapter 21. Amsterdam, 
The Netherlands: Elsevier Science B. V. 
Barofsky, J. 2011. "Estimating the Impact of Health Insurance in Developing Nations: Evidence 
from Mexico's Seguro Popular." Harvard University, School of Public Health and the 
Institute for Quantitative Social Science, unpublished manuscript. Available at 
http://sphweb.sph.harvard.edu/departments/global-health-and-
population/files/jmp_estimating_the_impact_of_health_insurance_11-28-2011.pdf 
Behrman, J. R. 2010. "The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Mexican 
PROGRESA Anti-Poverty and Human Resource Investment Conditional Cash." World 
Development 38(10):1473-1485. 
Black, F. 1976. “The Pricing of Commodity Contracts.” Journal of Financial Economics 3:167-
179. 
 
26 
Černý, A. 2004. Mathematical Techniques in Finance – Tools for Incomplete Markets. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Chen, R. 1985. "Solution of Minimax Problems Using Equivalent Differentiable Functions." 
Computers & Mathematics with Applications 11(12):1165-1169. 
Comercio e Integracion Agropecuaria, S. C. (CEIA). 2007. “Ventajas, Viabilidad y 
Requerimientos para la Instalación de una Bolsa de Físicos Agropecuarios en México.” 
México: Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Rural Sustentable y la Soberanía Alimentaria. 
Unpublished manuscript. 
Dana, J., and C. L. Gilbert. 2009. "Managing Agricultural Price Risk in Developing Countries." 
In H. Geman, ed., Risk Management in Commodity Markets: From Shipping to Agriculturals 
and Energy, Chapter 13. West Sussex, England: John Wiley & Sons. 
Diewert, W. E., D. A. Lawrence, and F. Thompson. 1998. "The Marginal Costs of Taxation and 
Regulation." In Thompson, F., and M. T. Green, eds., Handbook of Public Finance, pp. 135-
171. New York: Marcel Dekker. 
Dirección General de Industrias Básicas (DGIB). 2012. “Análisis de la Cadena de Valor Maíz-
Tortilla: Situación Actual y Factores de Competencia Local.” México: DGIB, Secretaría de 
Economía. 
DTB Associates, LLP. 2011. "Domestic Support and WTO Obligations in Key Developing 
Countries." Unpublished manuscript. Available at 
http://www.usarice.com/doclib/193/186/5652.pdf 
Echánove, F. 2009. “Políticas Públicas y Maíz en México: El Esquema de Agricultura por 
Contrato.” Anales de Geografía de la Universidad Complutense 29(2):65-82. 
Fox, J., and L. Haight, eds. 2010. Subsidizing Inequality: Mexican Policy Since NAFTA. 
Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 
Gardner, B. L. 1987. The Economics of Agricultural Policies. New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company. 
Gollier, C. 2001. The Economics of Risk and Time. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
 
27 
Grupo Consultor de Mercados Agrícolas (GCMA). 2011. "Análisis de los Mercados Nacionales 
de Productos Agrícolas Básicos - Abril 2011." Available at 
http://www.sagarpa.gob.mx/agronegocios/Documents/estudios_economicos/Seminarios/ento
rno_agroeconomico/PRODUCTIVIDAD%20Y%20COMPETITIVIDAD%20DE%20GRANO
S%20EN%20MEXICO%20(Abr%202011).pdf 
Harberger, A. C. 1997. "New Frontiers in Project Evaluation? A Comment on Devarajan, Squire, 
and Suthiwart-Narueput." World Bank Research Observer 12(1):73-79. 
Hennessy, D. A. 2011. “Modeling Stochastic Crop Yield Expectations with a Limiting Beta 
Distribution.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 36(1):177-191. 
Johnson, R., C. E. Hanrahan, and R. Schnepf. 2010. " Comparing U.S. and EU Program Support 
for Farm Commodities and Conservation." Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress R40539.  
Judd, K. L. 1998. Numerical Methods in Economics. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Knudsen, O., and J. Nash. 1990. “Domestic Price Stabilization Schemes in Developing 
Countries.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 38:539-558. 
Kocherlakota, N. 1996. “The Equity Premium: It’s Still A Puzzle.” Journal of Economic 
Literature 34:42-71. 
Kohls, R. L., and J. N. Uhl. 1990. Marketing of Agricultural Products, 7th Edition. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Lence, S. H. 2009a. “Do Futures Benefit Farmers?” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 91:154-167. 
–––. 2009b. “Joint Estimation of Risk Preferences and Technology: Flexible Utility or Futility?” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 91:581-598. 
Lerner, A. P. 1934. "The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power". 
Review of Economic Studies 1 (3):157-175. 
Nelson, C. H., and P. V. Preckel. 1989. “The Conditional Beta Distribution as a Stochastic 
Production Function.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 71(2):370-378. 
 
28 
Miranda, M., and P. Fackler. 2002. Applied Computational Economics and Finance. Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press. 
–––. 2013. Computational Methods in Economics - MATLAB Toolbox. Available at 
http://www4.ncsu.edu/~pfackler/compecon/toolbox.html 
Poterba, J. M. 1996. "Government Intervention in the Markets for Education and Health Care: 
How and Why?" In Fuchs, V. R., ed., Individual and Social Responsibility: Child Care, 
Education, Medical Care, and Long-Term Care in America, pp. 277-308. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Romano, R. E. 1988. "A Monopolist Should Always Be Subsidized no Matter How High the 
Excess Burden." Canadian Journal of Economics 21(4):871-873. 
Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación (SAGARPA). 
2010a. Cuarto Informe de Labores. México: SAGARPA. 
–––. 2010b. "Inventario de Infraestructura para el Almacenamiento de Granos y Oleaginosas en 
11 Estados del Sur de México." México: SAGARPA. 
–––. 2010c. "Quinta Sección: Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y 
Alimentación." México: Diario Oficial de la Federación de México, December 31. Available 
at http://www.sagarpa.gob.mx/agronegocios/Documents/ROP310311.pdf 
Servicio de Información Agroalimentaria y Pesquera (SIAP). 2009. “Indicadores Básicos del 
Sector Agroalimentario y Pesquero.” México: SIAP, SAGARPA. Available at 
http://www.campomexicano.gob.mx/portal_siap/Integracion/EstadisticaDerivada/Informacio
ndeMercados/Mercados/modelos/Indicadoresbasicos2009.pdf 
–––. 2010. “Indicadores Básicos del Sector Agroalimentario y Pesquero.” México: SIAP, 
SAGARPA. Available at 
http://www.campomexicano.gob.mx/portal_siap/Integracion/EstadisticaDerivada/Informacio
ndeMercados/Mercados/modelos/Indicadoresbasicos2009.pdf 
–––. 2015. Información Estadística de la Producción Agropecuaria y Pesquera Mexicana. 
México: SIAP, SAGARPA. Available at http://www.siap.gob.mx/produccion-agropecuaria/ 
 
29 
–––. 2007. "Situación Actual y Perspectivas del Maíz en México, 1996-2012." México: SIAP, 
SAGARPA. Available at 
http://w4.siap.gob.mx/sispro/SP_AG/Maiz/PortalesFijos/Situacion/maiz96-12.pdf 
Shields, D. A. 2012. “Crop Insurance Provisions in the 2014 Farm Bill (P.L. 113-79).” 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress R43494. Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service. 
Steffen, C., and F. Echánove. 2007. "El Maíz Amarillo Cultivado Bajo Contrato en México 
2000-2005: Reflexiones Sobre un Programa de Comercialización de Granos." Cuadernos 
Geográficos 40(1):107-132. 
The Economist. 2007. “Monopolies and Tortillas.” January 17th. 
Tirole, J. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service (USDA-ERS). 2010. 
"Brazil: Policy." Available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/international-
marketstrade/countries-regions/brazil/policy.aspx 
Verteramo Chiu, L. J., and C. G. Turvey. 2014. “Cross Market Price Support and Agricultural 
Development.” The Journal of Risk Finance 15(1):33-51. 
World Bank. 2010. Agricultural Insurance in Latin America: Developing the Market. Report No. 
61963-LAC. Washington, DC: World Bank Insurance for the Poor Program. 
–––. “Estados Unidos Mexicanos: Integración del Mercado Norteamericano de Maíz: 
Implicaciones para los Productores y Consumidores Mexicanos.” World Bank, Departamento 
de Desarrollo Sostenible, Región de América Latina y el Caribe, unpublished manuscript. 
Yang, X. Q. 1995. "Smoothing Approximations to Nonsmooth Optimization Problems." 
ANZIAM Journal 36(3):274-285. 
Zant, W. 2001. “Hedging Price Risks of Farmers by Commodity Boards: A Simulation Applied 
to the Indian Natural Rubber Market.” World Development 29:691-710. 
 
 
30 
Endnotes 
1. To streamline the exposition, in the rest of the article U.S. dollars will be referred to simply 
as “dollars.” 
2. It must be pointed out, however, that numerous studies (e.g., Steffen and Echánove 2007, 
Fox and Haight 2010, Verteramo Chiu and Turvey 2014, and Appendini 2014) have 
addressed other aspects of A×C. 
3. In the present study, the term “intermediaries” is used to refer generically to firms involved 
in the assembling, handling, and processing of raw commodities acquired from primary 
producers, and the distribution of processed products sold to final consumers. 
4. Intermediaries’ market power proved to be a recurrent theme in the numerous interviews 
were conducted with individuals involved in the operation of the A×C program. Anecdotal 
evidence (The Economist 2007, CEIA 2007) and formal econometric analysis (DGIB 2012) 
suggest that intermediaries possess market power in Mexico’s corn market. According to 
DGIB (2012), the market is concentrated among very few firms importing, storing, and 
commercializing corn, and there are barriers to the entry of new competitors. In the case of 
corn flour, the market share of the two largest producers has exceeded 90%. In addition, 
DGIB (2012) shows that there is a large number of regulations that limit competition in many 
local markets. 
5. For simplicity, in the remainder of the article “peso” will be used instead of “Mexican peso.” 
6. “Ingreso objetivo” paid out much less than A×C because market prices were typically above 
the set minimum prices. 
7. More specifically, the areas planted with corn, sorghum, and wheat were respectively 69%, 
18%, and 8% of the total. 
8. The ratio of ending stocks to annual consumption for corn ranged from 0.093 to 0.163 over 
the period 2007-2010 (SIAP 2009, 2010). The ratio of speculative storage demand to current 
consumption demand must have been even smaller than such figures, because ending stocks 
comprise working stocks in addition to speculative stocks (Kohls and Uhl 1990). Although in 
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practice it is impossible to determine the share of ending stocks held for speculative 
purposes, it is unlikely to be high because of the deficiencies in storage infrastructure 
(SAGARPA 2010b). For example, a study by the World Bank (2007, p. 8) concluded that 
‘Mexico’s storage infrastructure does not meet minimum standards, and lacks competency 
and instruments to finance stocks in warehouses.’ (translation of ours). 
9. As explained in the previous section, farmers (intermediaries) are legally obligated to deliver 
(receive) the crop under A×C’s forward contracts. For modeling purposes, penalties for 
failing to fulfil the contract are considered to be high enough to eliminate the incentive to not 
comply. 
10. Purchases from participants (qmG,2) and sales of final product (qmD,2) are not post-harvest 
choices, because the former are committed at contracting time (t = 1), and the latter are given 
by qmD,2 = qmG,2 + ,2mGq /  + qmW,2. 
11. Firm m's profits (7) are a function of min(B1, B2). Therefore, under the assumption that 
intermediaries consider the effect of their choices at time t = 2 on the post-harvest basis B2, 
firm m's profits are differentiable with respect to ,2mGq /  everywhere except at the point B1 = 
B2. More specifically, ∂min(B1, B2)/∂B2 equals 0 if B1 < B2 and 1 if B1 > B2, but does not exist 
if B1 = B2. As a result, if the optimum ,2mGq /  = * ,2MGq /
*
,2MGq /
 
 is such that B2( * ,2MGq / ) ≠ B1, then 
∂πm,2/ ,2mGq /∂  evaluated at ,2mGq /  = 
 
*
,2MGq /  does exist and FOC (9) holds. In contrast, FOC (9) 
does not exist if B2( * ,2MGq / ) = B1 (but the right- and left-hand derivatives ∂πm,2/ ,2mGq /∂  
evaluated at ,2mGq /  = 
 
*
,2MGq /  do exist and are negative and positive, respectively). The non-
existence of the derivative ∂min(B1, B2)/∂B2 at B1 = B2 is a technical issue that can be avoided 
altogether by substituting min(B1, B2) by a smooth approximating function equivalent at the 
limit to min(B1, B2) (Chen 1985, and Yang 1995). Therefore, the rest of the discussion will 
proceed as if min(B1, B2) were differentiable everywhere. 
12. In the standard textbook specification (e.g., Tirole 1988, p. 219), mmD is defined as firm m's 
market share divided by the own-price elasticity of demand. At the FOCs corresponding to 
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, mmD equals firm m's Lerner index (Lerner 1934). 
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13. The case of risk-averse intermediaries is not analyzed because it is not workable. However, 
risk-neutrality is a reasonable approximation because intermediaries are much better able to 
diversify risks than producers. 
14. In the Online Appendix A, a highly simplified version of the model is used to show the key 
drivers of basis risk. 
15. The pdfs underlying the expectations of endogenous variables in scenarios (a) and (b) are 
different. Hence, iU  and ,2( )i iU Y  are computed by employing the pdfs corresponding to the 
respective scenarios. 
16. Intermediaries' risk-neutrality implies that their compensating income can be calculated as 
simply ,2MY  = MU  − ,MU  where MU  ( MU ) denotes intermediaries' mean post-harvest 
profits in the presence (absence) of A×C. Similarly, the isoelastic demand used in the present 
application (see Subsection 3.1 below) can be derived from a quasilinear utility; therefore, 
consumers’ compensating income can be calculated as ,2DY  = DU  − ,DU  where DU  and DU  
represent, respectively, the mean consumer surpluses under scenarios (a) and (b) (Lence 
2009a). 
17. For example, the cost and demand functions discussed below are chosen because values for 
their parameters (elasticities and scaling factors) can easily set and interpreted based on 
actual data and previous studies. More involved functional forms can be used, but typically 
their parameterization is not as straightforward. 
18. Cost functions are assumed to be non-stochastic to avoid the curse of dimensionality. 
Stochastic costs could be obtained by incorporating multiplicative exogenous random shocks 
εi,t > 0 with expectations E0(εi,1) = E0(εi,2) = E1(εi,2) = 1. 
19. In other words, the A×C program is assumed to have no effect on the world crop market or 
the exchange rate. 
20. Uncovering the reasons why intermediaries' incentives have not materialized into larger (on 
average) compensatory basis payments to them instead of participants is beyond the scope of 
the present study. One plausible reason might be that under A×C both the forward basis as 
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well as the post-harvest basis are negotiated by representatives of intermediaries, 
participants, and government officials. Such mechanism may prevent intermediaries from 
setting bases so as to receive compensatory basis payments most of the years. 
21. To allow for the possibility of non-participants being less risk averse than participants, we 
also conducted simulations assuming risk-neutral non-participants ( Gˆλ/  = 0) and risk-averse 
averse participants with Gˆλ  = 3.1/ 0 ,2( )
A C
GE π
× . Results are omitted in the interest of space, but 
are available in the Online Appendix B. 
22. The value chosen to parameterize the number of farmers is arbitrary, because any change to it 
will be offset by a change in the calibrated value of κg, so as to leave aggregate mean output 
,2gQ  the same. 
23. Since in theory A×C has no downside for producers, all of them would participate if they 
could do so. In reality, however, participation involves registration and other costs that make 
the program less appealing or out of reach for small farmers (Steffen and Echánove 2007), 
and the scope of A×C is limited by government budget constraints (Echánove 2009). As a 
result, actual data indicate that participants are “commercial” producers, whereas non-
participants are small farmers (Echánove 2009). The model assumes that at planting time 
farmers know whether they will be able to participate or not. 
24. The calibration is performed under the A×C parameterization, because the historical 
observations correspond to a period when the A×C program was in place. 
25. The merits of providing government subsidies to promote the use of risk management tools 
already available (such as CME futures options) are debatable. However, if the tools were not 
used without the subsidies, the latter would be easier to rationalize (e.g., one might argue that 
the subsidies help familiarize agents with hedging instruments). Hence, although it is 
straightforward to perform the no-A×C simulations allowing for hedging, we restrict 
attention to the no-A×C scenario where neither participants nor intermediaries trade 
derivatives. The case analyzed is also the most interesting, as it involves the largest market 
and welfare effects across all sectors. If one assumes that participants and intermediaries buy 
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options even if subsidies are not provided, A×C’s market and welfare impacts are less 
pronounced. In the limiting no-A×C case where participants and intermediaries are fully 
hedged with options, introducing option subsidies would have essentially no effect in the 
amount produced by participants, and consequently little impact on imports, consumption, 
and non-participants’ output. In such instance; the subsidies would simply be pure transfers 
from taxpayers and society to participants and intermediaries, with no consequences for non-
participants or consumers. 
26. An anonymous reviewer noted that Verteramo Chiu and Turvey’s market-based quanto 
options (Verteramo Chiu and Turvey 2014), which require no taxpayers’ money, could 
provide an alternative price hedging mechanism to A×C. 
27. These triangles are computed as one-half of the product of the change in mean output times 
the change in the mean net price received. For participants, such calculations yield [0.5 × 
(3.6% × 7.14 million tn) × (5.3% × 2,815 pesos/tn)] under risk neutrality and [0.5 × (3.9% × 
7.12 million tn) × (4.8% × 2,825 pesos/tn)] under risk aversion. The corresponding figures 
for non-participants are [0.5 × (−0.3% × 15.44 million tn) × (−0.5% × 2,815 pesos/tn)] and 
[0.5 × (−0.3% × 15.44 million tn) × (−1.0% × 2,825 pesos/tn)]. To facilitate interpretation, 
values in pesos are reported in dollars, assuming an exchange rate of 12 pesos per dollar. 
28. This possibility is of more than academic interest. In personal interviews held with various 
stakeholders, the reduction of intermediaries' market power was often cited as a positive 
feature of A×C by its supporters. 
29. For example, in Panel A the marginal gains for risk-averse non-participants and participants 
are respectively 74 (= 53 − (−21)) and 37 (= 122 − 85) million dollars. 
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Table 1. Values of Non-Calibrated Parameters 
Planting/contracting period:a  (t1 − t0) = 1.5/12 years  Option cost recovery share:g  ωG = ωM = 0.6 
Contracting/post-harvest period:a  (t2 − t1) = 4/12 years  Output shock coefficient of variation:h  CVg = 0.2 
Number of producers:b  Gn  = 7.4 million, Gn /  = 15.4 million  Output shock skewness:
h  Skewg = −0.2 
Coefficient of absolute risk aversion:c λg = 3.1/ 0 ,2( )
A C
gE π
×   Output shock correlation:h  CorrelationGG/  = 0.1 
Production cost elasticity:  ηg = 2.5  Annual volatility of world price shocks:i  σF = 0.34 
Processing cost elasticity:  ηMD = 4  Annual volatility of exchange rate shocks:j  σX = 0.13 
Import cost elasticity:  ηMW = 1.1  Annual volatility of consumption shocks:k  σD = 0.06 
Consumer demand elasticity:  ηD = 0.7  Annual risk-free interest rate:  r = 0.02 
Futures price at planting:d  F0 = 178 dollars/tn  A×C Administration Cost:l 10% of Direct Subsidies 
Exchange rate at planting:e  X0 = 12 pesos/dollar  Marginal Deadweight Loss of Raising Tax Revenues:m 25% 
Intermediaries' market power:f  µMD = 0.1, µMg = 0.2   
aBased on SIAP (2007), ASERCA (2010a, 2010b), and Servicio de Información Agroalimentaria y Pesquera (SIAP). 
bSet equal to ng = ,2gQ  in Table 3.2 to facilitate computations (see main text). 
cCoefficient of relative risk aversion set equal to 3.1 following Zant (2001, p. 700). 
dBased on 2007-2010 average of daily settlement prices for the July 2007, July 2008, July 2009, July 2010, and July 2011 corn contracts at CME (Note: 
According to personal communications from ASERCA employees, July futures are used as reference for contracting purposes). 
eBased on 2007-2010 average of the daily "Tipo de Cambio FIX" from Banco de México (http://www.banxico.org.mx/portal-mercado-cambiario/index.html). 
fCalculated by employing the approximations µMD ≅ 1/[ηD × (Number of Intermediaries)] and µMg ≅ 1/[(g Supply Elasticity) × (Number of Intermediaries)] × (F0 
+ Basis)/Basis, with Basis = 55 dollars/tn (implied by ,2MGP /  in Table 2) and Number of Intermediaries = 14. 
gASERCA (2011, p. 33). 
hEstimated from annual changes in the logarithms of detrended corn yields over 1980-2010. The coefficient of variation, skewness, and correlation correspond to 
the period planting/post-harvest. The variance of the output shocks is assumed to increase linearly with time. 
iAnnualized historical standard deviation of the natural logarithm of the daily settlement prices for the July 2007, July 2008, July 2009, July 2010, and July 2011 
corn contracts at CME. 
jAnnualized historical standard deviation of the natural logarithm of the daily "Tipo de Cambio FIX" from Banco de México (http://www.banxico.org.mx/portal-
mercado-cambiario/index.html) over 2007-2010.  
k20.5 times the estimated standard deviation of the annual changes in log-consumption over the period 2002-2010 (SIAP, 
(http://www.siap.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12&Itemid=17). This implies that one-half of the variance of the year-to-year 
changes in log-consumption is attributed to demand shocks. 
lBudget figures in SAGARPA (2010a) imply that administering farm programs costs 23.4 pesos per 100 pesos in subsidies. 
mBehrman (2010). Estimates vary widely (Diewert, Lawrence, and Thompson 1998), but Harberger (1997) has proposed 20% to 25% as a lower-bound estimate 
of the marginal cost of public funds for almost all countries. For the United States, it is often assumed that one extra dollar in tax revenues costs 1.30 dollars to 
the economy (e.g., Poterba 1996), which is the cost adopted by Barofsky (2011) to assess the welfare impact of Mexico's "Seguro Popular." 
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Table 2. Values of Endogenous Variables Used to Calibrate Scaling Parameters 
 
Calibrating Endogenous Variable Value 
Mean participants' output:a ,2GQ  = 7.4 million tn 
Mean non-participants' output:b ,2GQ /  = 15.4 million tn 
Mean imports:c ,2WQ  = 8.0 million tn 
Mean price paid by consumers:d ,2DP  = 4,000 pesos/tn 
Mean price paid to non-participants:e ,2MGP /  = 2,800 pesos/tn 
a2007-2010 annual average production for "agricultura por contrato" (Grupo Consultor de Mercados Agrícolas 
(GCMA) 2011, pp. 24-25). 
bCalculated by subtracting the mean participants' output from the 2007-2010 annual average production (SIAP, 
http://www.siap.gob.mx/). 
c2007-2010 annual averages of imports (SIAP). 
d130% of the 2007-2010 averages of monthly market prices in the main consumption areas (GCMA). 
e2007-2010 averages of monthly market prices paid to producers (GCMA). 
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Table 3. Percentage Changes (Relative to the Scenario without A×C) in Equilibrium Prices, 
Quantities, Profits, and Consumer Expenditures Caused by A×C Program for Corn 
 
Variable Risk-Neutral Producers Risk-Averse Producers 
 Mean (St. Dev.) Mean (St. Dev.) 
 [0.1, 0.5, 0.9] Quantiles [0.1, 0.5, 0.9] Quantiles 
Net Prices:   
Received by Participants 5.3 (−18.5) 4.8 (−14.5) 
 [11.1, 2.4, −1.2] [11.1, 2.4, −1.4] 
Received by Non-Participants −0.5 (−6.4) −1.0 (−1.7) 
 [−0.1, −1.5, −1.3] [−0.1, −1.5, −1.5] 
Paid to Participants −5.6 (−32.2) −6.0 (−28.8) 
 [0.3, −2.6, −11.4] [0.3, −2.6, −11.6] 
Paid to Non-Participants −0.5 (−6.4) −1.0 (−1.7) 
 [−0.1, −1.5, −1.3] [−0.1, −1.5, −1.5] 
Paid by Consumers −0.1 (−0.4) −0.1 (−0.4) 
 [0.0, 0.0, −0.1] [0.0, −0.1, −0.2]    
Quantities:   
Participants’ Output 3.6 (3.6) 3.9 (3.9) 
 [3.6, 3.6, 3.6] [3.9, 3.9, 3.9] 
Non-Participants’ Output −0.3 (−0.3) −0.3 (−0.3) 
 [−0.3, −0.3, −0.3] [−0.3, −0.3, −0.3] 
Imports −2.4 (0.0) −2.6 (0.0) 
 [−6.2, −2.8, −1.4] [−6.7, −3.0, −1.5] 
Consumption 0.1 (−0.3) 0.1 (−0.3) 
 [0.1, 0.0, 0.0] [0.1, 0.0, 0.0]    
Profits:   
Participants 9.2 (−0.6) 8.5 (1.4) 
 [16.2, 10.8, 6.0] [14.0, 10.5, 5.9] 
Non-Participants −0.7 (−3.2) −1.5 (−1.8) 
 [0.3, −0.2, −1.3] [0.0, −0.4, −1.6] 
Intermediaries 4.0 (−42.9) 5.3 (−15.6) 
 [9.3, 5.1, 1.6] [9.5, 5.2, 1.9]    
Consumer Expenditures: 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 
 [0.0, 0.0, 0.0] [0.0, 0.0, 0.0]    
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
Table 4. Average Changes (Relative to the Scenario without A×C) in Equilibrium 
Surpluses Caused by A×C Program for Corn, for Different Levels of Intermediaries' 
Market Power (Measured in Million Dollars)a 
 
Sector Low Market Power  High Market Power 
 (µMD = 0.05, µMg = 0.1)  (µMD = 0.1, µMg = 0.2) 
 Risk-Neutral 
Producers 
Risk-Averse 
Producers 
 Risk-Neutral 
Producers 
Risk-Averse 
Producers 
Participants (p) 95 92  92 89 
Non-participants (n) −3 −12  −15 −23 
Intermediaries (i) 84 110  106 136 
Consumers (c) 8 8  8 9 
Taxpayers (t = d + a) −202 −202  −210 −210 
    Direct Subsidies (d) −184 −184  −191 −191 
    Administration (a = 0.1 d) −18 −18  −19 −19 
Society (s = 0.25 t) −50 −50  −53 −53 
Total (= p + n + i + c + t + s) −70 −56  −71 −52 
aOriginal figures are computed in Mexican pesos, but to facilitate interpretation they are converted into U.S. dollars 
at the fixed exchange rate of 12 pesos per dollar. 
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Table 5. Average Changes (Relative to the Scenario without A×C) in Equilibrium Surpluses 
Caused by A×C Program for Corn, Assuming that Intermediaries' Market Power in the 
Crop Market Equals ˆ A CMgµ
× ( )⋅  under the no-A×C Scenario (Measured in Million Dollars)a 
 
A. Intermediaries' market power levels of µMD = 0.05 and ˆ A CMgµ
× (0.1) . 
 
Sector Risk-Neutral Producers 
ˆ A CMgµ
× (0.1)  = 0.184 
 Risk-Averse Producers 
ˆ A CMgµ
× (0.1)  = 0.207 
 A CMgµ
×  = 0.1 [ A CMgµ
×  = 0.184]  A CMgµ
×  = 0.1 [ A CMgµ
×  = 0.207] 
Participants (p) 120 [88]  122 [85] 
Non-participants (n) 51 [−15]  53 [−21] 
Intermediaries (i) 0 [103]  0 [130] 
Consumers (c) 15 [6]  16 [7] 
Taxpayers (t) −202 [−200]  −202 [−200] 
Society (s = 0.25 t) −50 [−50]  −50 [−50] 
Total (= p + n + i + c + t + s) −67 [−68]  −62 [−50] 
 
B. Intermediaries' market power levels of µMD = 0.1 and ˆ A CMgµ
× (0.2) . 
 
Sector Risk-Neutral Producers 
ˆ A CMgµ
× (0.2)  = 0.321 
 Risk-Averse Producers 
ˆ A CMgµ
× (0.2)  = 0.346 
 A CMgµ
×  = 0.2 [ A CMgµ
×  = 0.321]  A CMgµ
×  = 0.2 [ A CMgµ
×  = 0.346] 
Participants (p) 125 [82]  126 [81] 
Non-participants (n) 53 [−30]  59 [−34] 
Intermediaries (i) 0 [130]  0 [153] 
Consumers (c) 19 [5]  21 [6] 
Taxpayers (t) −210 [−205]  −210 [−205] 
Society (s = 0.25 t) −53 [−51]  −53 [−51] 
Total (= p + n + i + c + t + s) −66 [−70]  −57 [−50] 
 
aOriginal figures are computed in Mexican pesos, but to facilitate interpretation they are converted into U.S. dollars 
at the fixed exchange rate of 12 pesos per dollar. 
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Time:                                                 Planting                      Contracting                 Post-harvest 
                                                             (t = 0)                           (t = 1)                            (t = 2)  
Elapsed time:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expected participants’ output           E0(QG,2) 
Expected non-participants’ output   0 ,2( )GE Q /  
Forward post-harvest basis (dollars/tn)                                       B1 
Actual participants’ output                                                                                              QG,2 
Actual non-participants’ output                                                                                      ,2GQ /  
Imports                                                                                                                            QW,2 
Final consumption                                                                                                           QD,2 
Actual post-harvest basis (dollars/tn)                                                                              B2 
Price received by participants (pesos/tn)                                                                         PG,2 
Price received by non-participants (pesos/tn)                                                                 ,2GP/  
Price paid to participants (pesos/tn)                                                                                 PMG,2 
Price paid to non-participants (pesos/tn)                                                                         ,2MGP /  
Price paid by consumers (pesos/tn)                                                                                  PD,2 
World price (dollars/tn)                          F0                               F1 = F0 εF,1                    F2 = F1 εF,2 
Exchange rate (pesos/dollar)                  X0                               X1 = X0 εX,1                     X2 = X1 εX,2 
 
 
Figure 1. Timing framework for the analysis 
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Figure 2. Probability density functions of corn prices with and without A×C, assuming risk-averse producers 
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